ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
his study examines the role of institutional investors in the pricing of normal accruals and discretionary accruals, and whether they are misled by earnings management. Sloan (1996) demonstrates that investors overestimate the persistence of accruals causing the accruals to be overpriced; he further proposes that the mispricing of accruals is due to earnings fixation by naïve investors (e.g., individual investors). Recent evidence suggests that even sophisticated participants of the stock market such as institutional investors, financial analysts and auditors also misprice the accruals (Ali et al., 2000; Bradshaw et al., 2001 ; Collins et al., 2003) , but institutional investors can significantly mitigate the extent of accruals' mispricing (Collins et al., 2003; Barone and Magilke, 2009 ). However, how institutional investors mitigate accruals mispricing and why they cannot fully eliminate accruals mispricing is still not clear. To answer these questions, we extend prior research (e.g., Xie, 2001 ; Collins et al., 2003) by decomposing total accruals into discretionary accruals and normal accruals. This decomposing enables us to investigate separately the effects of investor sophistication on: (1) normal accruals, which represent the "natural attribute" of total accruals; and (2) discretionary accruals, which represent the outcome of managerial earnings management. By comparing the pricing efficiency of institutional investors on these two types of accruals, we can better comprehend their superiority in pricing accruals, and what prevents them from fully and accurately pricing the accruals.
Following prior research (Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001 ; Beneish and Vargus, 2002), we use the Mishkin (1983) test to address our research questions. The Mishkin test provides a statistical comparison between accruals' ability to predict one-year-ahead earnings (persistence) and investors' valuation of accruals' persistence. If the investors' valuation of accruals' persistence is higher than accruals' persistence, then the overpricing of accruals is indicated. Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we compare the pricing between discretionary accruals and normal accruals. Second, we examine whether the extent of discretionary mispricing differs between firms with high institutional ownership and firms with low institutional ownership. The extent of normal accruals' mispricing difference is also examined. Third, we examine changes in institutional ownership in response to discretionary accruals and normal accruals. These analyses are based on the sample of listed Chinese (A-share) firms from 2001 and 2010.
Our persistence tests reveal that the normal accruals are significantly more persistent than the discretionary accruals. This result provides evidence that the earnings management will lower the persistence of accruals. The results of the pricing test are as follows. 1) The mispricing of the discretionary is greater than normal accruals, indicating that the mispricing of total accruals is due largely to the earnings management. 2) With respect to normal accruals, we find there is no evidence that institutional investors misprice these accruals, while the individual investors overprice normal accruals; we conjecture that the institutional investors' superiority to mitigate the mispricing of total accruals is mainly due to their accurate pricing of normal accruals. 3) Both individual investors and institutional investors significantly overprice discretionary accruals, while the extent of mispricing for institutional investors is significantly lower than that of individual investors; our findings indicate that the reason why institutional investors cannot fully eliminate accruals mispricing is that they are partly misled by the earnings management; 4) Institutional ownership changes are negatively related to accruals, indicating that institutional investors will sell stocks in response to high accruals. We also find that institutional investors are more sensitive to normal accruals than to discretionary accruals.
Our study provides some of the first insights into which type of accruals institutional investors tend to misprice, and help us in better understanding the role of institutional investors in accruals' mispricing. Taken together, our results support the naïve-investor hypothesis for the accruals anomaly, and show that earnings management is an important source of accruals mispricing for both individual investors and institutional investors in the context of the Chinese emerging capital market. Our results also provide useful information for institutional investor research, showing that the mitigating effect of institutional investors on accruals' mispricing is mainly due to their accurate pricing of normal accruals, and that institutional investors cannot fully understand the more complex discretionary accruals.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews relevant literature and develops our hypothesis. In section 3, we describe our samples and data. In section 4, we present our main results and discuss our findings. The summary and limitations are in the final sections.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

The Mispricing of Accruals
Accounting information plays a very important role in the capital market. However, Sloan (1996) finds that the market does not fully understand the information contained in the components of earnings (i.e., cash flow and accruals). Cash flow and accruals are different in the implication of future profitability; however, investors fail to understand this fact, so they overestimate the persistence of accruals, and therefore, overprice the accruals. A trading strategy that takes a long position of the low-accruals firms and a short position of the high-accruals firms can obtain a significant abnormal return in the following year. After Sloan (1996) , a number of studies have examined the presence of an accruals anomaly (Thomas, 1999 Adamek and Kaserer (2006) provide evidence that the accrual anomaly is also present in Germany. Lev and Nissim (2006) show that the accruals anomaly still persists since Sloan (1996) found it. As to China, Li et al. (2011) documents the presence of accrual mispricing in China's stock market.
Several studies provide numerous explanations for the accruals anomaly. Fairfield et al. (2003) document that the accruals are more highly correlated with invested capital, so the lower persistence of accruals stems from the effect of growth on future profitability. Some research focuses on the component of total accruals, such as special items or inventory changes. Dechow and Ge (2006) find that investors cannot fully appreciate the transitory nature of special items and showed that the special items are a significant contributing factor to low persistence of earnings in low-accruals firms. Richardson et al. (2006) provide evidence that the lower persistence of accruals was primarily due to temporary accounting distortions. Zhang (2007) investigates the growth and persistence hypotheses for the accruals anomaly, concluding that it is due to the fundamental investment information contained in accruals.
Existing research also provides evidence that discretionary accruals are mispriced by investors. Teoh et al. (1998a Teoh et al. ( , 1998b and Rangan (1998) provide evidence that accruals are managed upwards to increase earnings in the year prior to and in the year of initial public offerings or seasoned equity offerings, and in such, investors overprice these discretionary accruals. Xie (2001) documents that the market overprices the persistence of abnormal accruals and the results show that the abnormal returns to the abnormal accruals-based hedge portfolio is significantly larger than the abnormal returns to the normal accruals-based hedge portfolio. Pincus et al. (2007) provide similar evidence in a global setting. Thomas and Zhang (2002) find that inventory changes can explain the negative relationship between accruals and future returns. They conjecture that earnings management masks the future profitability reversals due to inventory changes. Discretionary accruals are the result of the managerial earnings management, while normal accruals are the result of the normal operation activities. Thus, current earnings are less likely to persist if they mainly stem from the discretionary accruals and it is difficult for investors to recognize managerial earnings management. Therefore, our first hypothesis is as follows:
H1:
The mispricing of discretionary accruals is greater than that of normal accruals.
Institutional Investors and Accruals Mispricing
Prior research often characterized institutional investors as sophisticated investors who can better understand firm's earnings component. Ke and Petroni (2004) find that transient institutional investors can predict a break in a string of consecutive quarterly earnings increase, thereby avoiding the forthcoming loss. They also provide evidence that institutional investors obtain information about forthcoming earnings breaks from managers through private communications. Jiambalvo et al. (2002) argue that institutional investors can better use both current-period information and non-earnings information to predict future earnings. Ali et al. (2004) find that changes in institutional ownership are related to abnormal returns at the time of the subsequent announcements of quarterly earnings, supporting that the institutional investors can trade based on information about forthcoming earnings.
A large body of empirical research also provides evidence that higher institutional ownership will lead to stock prices reflecting more earning information. Ayers and Freeman (2003) show that the price of firms with high institutional investors incorporates future earnings earlier than other firms. Piotroski 
H2:
The normal accruals are overpriced for firms with low institutional ownership, while the normal accruals are accurately priced for firms with high institutional ownership. http://www.cluteinstitute.com/ © 2013 The Clute Institute Prior research studies sophisticated investors' reaction to earnings management. Balsam et al. (2002) find that institutional investors play an important role in determining the timing of the market reaction to earnings management. Their results show that institutional investors can quickly respond to accruals management. They hypothesize that institutional investors have superior analytical skills, and can better decompose accruals into discretionary and normal components than individual investors. Another possibility is that the institutional investors have better information sources, such as conference calls and private conversations with management (Ke and Petroni, 2004) , to allow them access to information that can help them to recognize earnings management more easily and/or quickly than individual investors. Therefore, we predict that institutional investors can better price the persistence of discretionary accruals than individual investors. However, the relationship between discretionary accruals and future earnings is more complex than the relationship between normal accruals and future earnings, so institutional investors may not fully eliminate the mispricing of accruals. This leads to our next hypothesis:
H3:
The discretionary accruals are overpriced for both firms with low and high institutional ownership, while firms with high institutional ownership are associated with a significant reduction in this mispricing.
Following Collins (2003), we examine whether the differential accrual mispricing between individual investors and institutional investors is due to the institutional investors' trading based on accruals information. If the institutional investors are more sophisticated and better understand the accruals, then we expect the higher accruals (both discretionary accruals and normal accruals) will cause more institutional selling, making the accruals negatively related to the institutional ownership changes. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
H4:
The institutional ownership changes are negatively correlated with both the normal accruals and discretionary accruals.
DATA AND SAMPLE
Sample Selection and Data Source
We use all Chinese listed (A share) firms from 2001 to -2010 as the initial sample. Financial statement data are collected from the CSMAR China Stock Market Financial Statements Database, return data are obtained from the CSMAR China Stock Market Trading Database, and institutional investor ownership data are collected from Wind Financial Database. Our sample begins in 2001 because the new accounting standard was released during that year. We exclude the financial firms (with an industry code of "I") because they have a different kind of financial statement.
Measurement of the variables
Similar to Collins (2003) , we use the categorical classification instead of using a continuous measure to enhance the power of our tests. Firms with zero institutional ownership are grouped into the low institutional ownership subsample (hereafter "LIO"), and firms with institutional ownership higher than median are grouped into the high institutional ownership subsample (hereafter "HIO"). The final samples are 7,813 firm-years, with 2,854 firm-years in the HIO subsample and 4,959 firm-years in the LIO subsample.
We use the cross-sectional version of the Modified Jones (1991) Model that was presented by Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) 
where accruals t is the difference between net income before extraordinary items and net cash flow from operating activities; TA t is the average total asset in year t; ΔREV t is the change in sales revenues between year t-1 and year t; ΔREV t is the change in account receivables between year t-1 and year t; and PPE t is gross property, plant and equipment. Following Xie (2001), we denote the predicted values of accruals from the Modified Jones Model as normal accruals (NAcc) and the residuals as discretionary accruals (DAcc). Annual, size-adjusted, buy-and-hold returns from the beginning of the fifth month after the firm's fiscal year-end. BM Book-to-market ratio, the book value to market value. Size Natural logarithm of the market value of equity Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample and the LIO/HIO subsamples. Similar to Xie (2001) and Collins (2003) , average accruals are negative (-0.017) and the discretionary accruals are near zero (0.003). Comparing the financial characteristics of firms between LIO and HIO, we find that the HIO subsample has better performance than the LIO subsample. For example, the earnings of the HIO subsample is 0.08, which is higher than the earnings of the LIO subsample of 0.018; the HIO subsample also has more cash flow (0.086) than the LIO subsample (0.042), as with the accruals. However, the magnitude of normal accruals does not differ significantly across the two subsamples (-0.021 and -0,018). In the HIO subsample, the average institutional ownership is 21.261%, which is far below the 63.6% reported by Collins (2003) . We do the 1% winsorization to the data to smooth the effect of outliers. 3: Statistics' significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively (two-tail).
RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS
Institutional Ownership and Accruals Mispricing
Following Sloan (1996), Xie (2001), and Beneish & Vargus (2002), we use the framework proposed by Mishkin (1983) to test our hypotheses H1~H3. The Mishkin (1983) test is a two-stage rational expectations procedure, where the null hypothesis is that the investors rationally price the persistence of earnings components. Equation (2) is a forecasting equation to measure the persistence of the earnings component for predicting the oneyear-ahead earnings. Equation (3) In Equations (2) and (3), the coefficients β 1 and β 2 capture the persistence of discretionary accruals and normal accruals for the LIO subsample, while the coefficients β 3 and β 4 capture the persistence of discretionary accruals and normal accruals for the HIO subsample. β * 1 and β * 2 capture the investors' perception of persistence for discretionary accruals and normal accruals in the LIO subsample, while β * 3 and β * 4 capture the investors' perception of persistence for discretionary accruals and normal accruals in the HIO subsample. We estimate Equations (2) and (3) jointly using a two-stage iterative generalized nonlinear least-squares procedure. In the first stage, Equations (2) and (3) are estimated without imposing any constraints; in the second stage, Equations (2) and (3) are estimated after imposing the rational pricing constraints to test whether the investors' perception of persistence (e.g., β * 1 ) are significantly different from the persistence of earnings components (e.g., β 1 ) obtained from the first stage.
For the LIO subsample, we expect that both discretionary accruals and normal accruals will be overestimated, which means the valuation of persistence that investors implicitly assign to discretionary accruals and normal accruals are higher than the persistence of discretionary accruals and normal accruals for predicting oneyear-ahead earnings (β 1 <β * 1 and β 2 <β * 2 ). For the HIO subsample, we expect both discretionary accruals and normal accruals will be accurately priced, which means the valuation of persistence that investors implicitly assign to discretionary accruals and normal accruals are similar to the persistence of discretionary accruals and normal accruals for predicting one-year-ahead earnings (β 3 ≈β * 3 and β 4 ≈β * 4 ). According to Collins (2003) , the ratio of persistence to perceived persistence (e.g. β 1 /β * 1 ) can be used as an efficiency ratio to compare the pricing efficiency between subsamples. If one component of accruals is mispriced by both the LIO subsample and the HIO subsample, we can use this ratio to compare the extent of the mispricing. If so, we predict that the ratio of HIO is bigger than the ratio of LIO, which means HIO can better price the persistence of accruals component. The results of the Mishkin test are presented in Table 3 . The persistence of discretionary accruals is significantly lower than the persistence of normal accruals (β 1 =0.337<β 2 =0.563, p=0.000) for the LIO subsample, as with the HIO subsample (β 3 =0.448 < β 4 =0.522, p=0.064), which indicate that the persistence of discretionary accruals is lower than normal accruals. The pricing parameter of normal accruals and discretionary accruals for the LIO subsample are not different (β , which means that the institutional investors feel the discretionary accruals are more persistent than the normal accruals. We conjecture that the institutional investors may fully understand the implication of future earnings embedded in the normal accruals but they are misled by the earnings management, so that their valuation of persistence for discretionary accruals is higher.
Next, we shift our focus to the comparison of accruals' persistence with respect to future earnings and the investors' perceived persistence. In Panel A of Table 3 , the persistence of normal accruals (β 2 ) is 0.563, while the investors' perceived persistence (β is not rejected, suggesting that the normal accruals are not mispriced in the HIO subsample. All in all, the result that LIO's normal accruals are mispriced and HIO's normal accruals are not mispriced fully support our hypothesis H2, indicating that the institutional investors can better price the normal accruals.
The pricing tests of discretionary accruals yield the following. For the LIO subsample, the persistence of discretionary accruals (β 1 ) is 0.337, which is significantly lower than the investors' perceived persistence (β .521) is significantly higher (p=0.001) than that of LIO (β 1 /β* 1 =0.350), indicating that although the HIO subsample also overestimates the discretionary accruals, the level of the overestimation is much lower than that of the LIO subsample. Thus, our hypothesis H3 is supported.
Finally, we compare the mispricing of the normal accruals and discretionary accruals. For the LIO subsample, the pricing efficiency ratio of discretionary accruals (β 1 /β * 1 =0.350) is significantly lower than normal accruals (β 2 /β * 2 =0.580); for the HIO subsample, the discretionary accruals are mispriced, while the normal accruals are accurately priced. Taken together, the results show that the mispricing of the discretionary accruals is greater than the mispricing of normal accruals, supporting our hypothesis H1, and indicating that the accruals' mispricing is due largely to the earnings management.
Institutional Investors' Trading Behavior in Response to Normal Accruals and Discretionary Accruals
To further examine whether the differential accrual mispricing between the LIO and HIO subsamples is due to the institutional investors' trading behavior based on accruals information, we investigate the relationship between changes in institutional ownership from year t-1 to year t and the accruals at year t-1. If institutional investors can understand the accruals' future earnings implications, which means high accruals related to future earnings reversal, they will sell stocks with high accruals. Hence, we expect a negative relationship between changes in institutional ownership and last year's accruals. Following Collins (2003) , we use Equations (4) and (5) to test our hypothesis, H4. In Equation (4), C_IO represents the institutional ownership changes from year t-1 to year t. The control variables include Book-to-Market ratio, size and industry dummies. Other variables are as defined previously. We decompose total accruals into discretionary accruals and normal accruals in Equation (5) 2: Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively (two-tail). Table 4 reports the result from estimating Equations (4) and (5) . Coefficient estimates of accruals, discretionary accruals and normal accruals are all significantly negative, indicating that institutional investors will sell stocks in response to high accruals, which support our hypothesis H4. Additionally, recall that results from Table 3 show that the persistence of normal accruals is higher than discretionary accruals, but the magnitude of DAcc's coefficient (a 1 =-0.081) in Equation (5) is smaller than NAcc's coefficient (a 2 =-0.309), which shows that the institutional investors have a greater response to normal accruals than to discretionary accruals. This result is consistent with the notion that the institutional investors are not always fully sophisticated and they also could be misled by the earnings management.
CONCLUSION
This paper examines the association between investor sophistication and the mispricing of discretionary accruals and normal accruals using a sample of listed Chinese (A-Share) firms from 2001 to 2010. By explicitly decomposing total accruals into normal accruals, which come from the normal activities of the firm, and discretionary accruals, which come from the managerial earnings management, we are able to investigate the different responses made by investors to these accruals. Following prior research, we employ the Mishkin (1983) test of rational expectation to empirically test whether the investors rationally price the persistence of normal accruals and discretionary accruals. The results show that: 1) the mispricing of discretionary accruals is more severe than the mispricing of normal accruals; 2) for normal accruals, the institutional investors accurately price the normal accruals, while the individual investors overprice the normal accruals; 3) for discretionary accruals, both institutional investors and individual investors overestimate the discretionary accruals, while institutional investors are associated with a significantly smaller overpricing; and 4) changes in institutional ownership are more related to the normal accruals rather than the discretionary accruals, showing that institutional investors cannot fully see through earnings management. In sum, our findings support the naïve-investor hypothesis for the accruals anomaly, as sophisticated institutional investors mitigate the mispricing of both discretionary accruals and normal accruals. We also find that institutional investors are partly misled by earnings management. This paper contributes to accruals anomaly research by providing more evidence of the effect of investor sophistication on different components of the accruals. In addition, we show that earnings management is an important source of accruals mispricing for both individual investors and institutional investors. Our findings also have implications for institutional investor research. Although prior research has documented the fact that institutional investors can mitigate accruals' mispricing, we provide more direct evidence about the edge of institutional investors' superiority in the Chinese stock market: namely, that they can understand the normal accruals
